CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTSUPREME COURT ADOPTS STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD TO REVIEW THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION MEAS-

URES-Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
The fourteenth amendment guarantees "to any person ...
the equal protection of the laws."' In early cases, the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the equal protection clause to
mandate that its "provisions are universal in their application, to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of nationality ....

Presum-

ably, supporters and sponsors of the amendment utilized conflicting interpretations of the phrase "equal protection."
Legislative history does little to clarify whether any sort of consensus was accomplished at the time the amendment was
adopted. 3 While the Supreme Court recognized that blacks were
4
primarily the intended beneficiaries of the adopted protections,
the amendment's language was not confined to so limited a class
or to so limited a purpose. 5
The equal protection clause was, however, "[v]irtually strangled in infancy by post-civil-war judicial reactionism." 6 During
this dormant stage, the United States became a nation of minorities. 7 "Each had to struggle-and to some extent struggles stillI U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment also states that
"[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
2 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) ("term 'person' in this context encompasses lawfully
admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States and entitles both
citizens and aliens to the equal protection.of the laws of the State in which they
reside").
3 J. Frank & R. Munro, The Original Understandingof "Equal Protection of the Laws,"
50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950).
4 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873). The Supreme Court's initial
view of the fourteenth amendment was that its "one pervading purpose" was "the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and
the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppression of those
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." Id. at 71.
5 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293 (1978) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion). "Although many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
conceived of its primary function as bridging the vast distance between members of
the Negro race and the white 'majority,' the Amendment itself was framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude." Id. (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873)).
6 J. Tussman & J. TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 381 (1949).
7 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
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to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a
'majority' composed of various minority groups of whom it was
said---perhaps unfairly in many cases-that a shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups."" Thus, the
clause gradually became applicable to all classifications of minorities by legislative and other bureaucratic sanction, although not
with much initial success. 9 Currently, the equal protection
clause, in the areas of fundamental liberties and civil rights, affords-courts extensive powers of review with regard to differential treatment of persons and classes.'
Of critical importance in equal protection litigation is the degree to which government is permitted to take race into account
in order to formulate and implement a remedy to overcome the
effects of past discrimination against the class." The issue is
often framed in terms of reverse discrimination or affirmative action inasmuch as the governmental action deliberately favors the
members of the class and may simultaneously impact adversely
upon nonmembers of the class.' 2 The United States Supreme
Court has accepted both the use of race as a valid factor in formulating remedies to overcome discrimination and the according
of preferences to class members when the class has previously
been the object of discrimination.' 3 While in prior cases the
Supreme Court gave plenary review to programs that expressly
used race as the prime consideration in the awarding of some
public benefit, it had never, until recently, definitely settled on a
standard for reviewing the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action. 1' In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. ,15 a majority of
8 Id. (footnotes omitted). "Members of the various religious and ethnic groups,
primarily but not exclusively of Eastern, Middle, and Southern European ancestry,

such as Jews, Catholics, Italians, Greeks and Slavic groups, continue to be excluded
from executive, middle-management, and other job levels because of discrimination based upon their religion and/or national origin." Id. at 292 n.32 (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 60-50.1(b) (1977)).
9 In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927), the Supreme Court upheld a statute
mandating involuntary sterilization of mentally retarded persons.
10 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.

11 Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 712 (1989).
See N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY

12

AND PUBLIC

POLICY (1975); B. GROSS, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (1977).
13 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (federal public works stat-

ute setting aside contracts funds for businesses owned by members of minority
races upheld); United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Title
VII of Civil Rights Act does not prohibit private employees from voluntarily using
an affirmative action employment program).
14 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721.

15 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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the Supreme Court adopted a strict scrutiny standard to review
the constitutionality of race-conscious remedial measures.' 6
On April 11, 1983, a public hearing in Richmond, Virginia
disclosed that despite the city's 50% black population, only
0.67% of Richmond's construction contracts during the years
1978 through 1983 were awarded to minority businesses.' 7 In
response to this revelation, the Richmond Council adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan (Plan) to set aside part of the
city's construction expenditures for minority-owned businesses.' 8 Generally, the Plan required all non-minority prime
contractors awarded construction contracts by the city to subcontract a minimum of 30% of the contract's dollar value to Minority
Business Enterprises (MBE)' 9 unless the requirement was
waived. 20 No geographic limits were imposed; any otherwise eligible MBE, regardless of locale, could utilize the 30% set-aside. 2 '
The Plan expressed a "remedial" nature and envisioned "wider
participation by minority business enterprises in the construction
of public projects." '2 2 The Plan was designed to automatically expire on June 30, 1988, approximately five years after its
commencement. 2 3
Id. at 721. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard, seeJ. NOWACK, R.
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448-49 (1983) ("If a law burdens a
class of persons because of the 'suspect' traits of race, national origin or status as a
resident alien, the justices will subject the law to independent 'strict scrutiny' to
determine if it promotes a compelling interest of the government.")
17 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 714.
18 Id. at 712-13.
19 Id. at 713. The Plan defined an MBE as "[a] business at least fifty-one percent
of which is owned and controlled or fifty-one percent minority-owned and operated
by minority group members, or in case of a stock corporation, at least fifty-one
percent of the stock which is owned and controlled by minority group members."
J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 182 n.3 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated
and remanded, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd 109
S. Ct. 706 (1989). The Richmond Council categorized "minority group members"
as "[c]itizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." Id.
20 Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 712-13. According to the Plan, waivers would be granted
only in exceptional circumstances. See Croson, 779 F.2d at 197. The Plan allowed
waivers only where it was
shown that every feasible attempt has been made to comply, and it must
be demonstrated that sufficient, relevant, qualified Minority Business
Enterprises (which can perform subcontracts or furnish supplies specified in the contract bid) are unavailable or are unwilling to participate in
the contract to enable meeting the 30% MBE goal.
Id.
21 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 713.
22 Id.
23 Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 713. The ordinance's expiration did not render the con16
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On September 6, 1983, five months after the Plan's enactment, Richmond invited bids for the installation of fixtures at the
cityjail.2 4 TheJ.A. Croson Company (Croson), a non-MBE contractor, submitted a bid. 25 Eugene Bonn, Croson's regional manager, determined that a minority contractor had to supply the
fixtures in order to comply with the 30% set-aside provision.26
Although Bonn telephoned several MBE's to obtain quotes on
the fixtures, none tendered a quote or indicated any interest in
the project. 27 On the last day for bid submission, Melvin Brown,
president of a local MBE, expressed to Bonn that Continental
Metal Hose (Continental) desired to participate in the project. 28
In response to Brown's subsequent attempts to acquire a price
quotation for the fixtures, an agent of Bradley informed him that
a credit check was mandatory prior to tendering a quote.29
Brown was advised that Bradley would require at least thirty days
to complete the credit check.30
City officials opened the sealed bids on October 13, 1983," 1
at which time Brown informed Croson that his bid submission
had been hindered by complications in obtaining credit approval. 2 On October 19, 1983, Croson requested a waiver of
the 30% set-aside requirement. 33 Brown subsequently submitted
troversy between Croson and Richmond moot. Id. at 713 n. 1. A viable controversy
remained as to whether the city's refusal to grant Croson a contract in compliance
with the ordinance was unlawful, thus entitling Croson to damages. Id.
24 Id. at 715. The project involved installing water closets and stainless steel
urinals which were manufactured by either Bradley Manufacturing Company (Bradley) or Acorn Engineering Company (Acorn). Id.
25 Id. at 715.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.

at 715. Croson was the sole bidder, submitting a bid of $126,530 which
included a non-minority firm's quote for the plumbing fixtures. Id.
32 Id. Croson's request stipulated that Continental was unqualified and that the
other contracted MBE's were either unable to quote or were unresponsive. Id.
33 Id. At this time, Croson still had not received Continental's bid. Id. According to the Plan, a prime contractor's waiver request would be referred to Richmond's Human Relations Commission (HRC). Id. at 713. The HRC would then
make recommendations respecting the 30% set-aside waiver request. Id. (citing
Croson, 779 F.2d 181, 196 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1016
(1986), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989)). The Director of General Services would make a plenary and final determination on the
appropriateness of granting a waiver. Id. (citing Croson, 779 F.2d at 196). Once a
contract was allotted, a bidder who was denied an award for failing to adhere to the
MBE requirements could protest under the city's procurement policies. Id. (citing
RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 12-126(a) (1985)).
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a bid to Croson and informed city officials that Continental could
provide the required fixtures. 4 The city therefore denied
Croson's waiver request and gave Croson ten days to submit a
completed MBE Utilization Commitment Form.35 Instead of
complying with the city's instructions, Croson requested that the
contract price be raised. 6 Richmond denied Croson's request
and informed Croson that the city decided to rebid the project. 7
Croson requested a review of the waiver denial, but Richmond
rejected Croson's request on the ground that the city chose to
rebid the project and such decision was not appealable. 8
Croson subsequently filed a complaint in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that Richmond's ordinance was unconstitutional. 39 The district court upheld Richmond's Plan in all respects and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.4" The United States Supreme Court
34 Id. at 715. The bid on the fixtures for Continental was $6,183.29 higher than
the figure Croson had incorporated in its bid to Richmond. Id. Utilizing Continental's bid would have increased the project's cost by $7,663.16. Id.
35 Id. Richmond would provide bidders on city construction projects with a "Minority Business Utilization Plan Commitment Form." Id. at 713. The lowest bidder
would be required to advance a commitment from listing the MBE's slated for the
project and the ratio of the contract price awarded to the MBE. Id. The city would
then refer the form to Richmond's HRC in order to verify the validity of the MBE.
Id. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The city warned Croson that its failure to submit a Minority Business Utilization Plan Commitment Form could result
in the bid being considered unresponsive. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 715.
36 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 715. Croson's request was submitted on November 8,
1983. Id. Croson argued that Continental was unqualified, that Continental's quotation was offered 21 days after the bid date, and the quotation was markedly
higher than the other quotations Croson had received. Id. In another letter,
Croson documented the additional costs which would result from using Continental to provide the fixtures, and therefore, requested that the contract price be increased by $7,663.16. Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 715-16. According to the Richmond Code, the appeal procedures are
only available after an award is made. Id. SeeJ.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond,
779 F.2d 181, 184 n.5 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986),
rev'd, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (citing RICHMOND,
VA., CIrv CODE, Ch. 24.1, Art. VII (c) (1985)). Here, no award was made since the
city elected to rebid the project. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 716.
39 Id. Croson originally filed the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the circuit court of the City of Richmond. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 716. The action was removed to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 182
n.1 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1355
(4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). Original jurisdiction over Croson's
federal constitutional claims was conferred upon the district court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982); the district court also considered pendent state law claims.
Croson, 779 F.2d at 182 n.l.
40 Croson, 779 F.2d at 182. Both courts employed a test derived from Fullilove v.
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granted certiorari, vacated the court of appeal's opinion, and remanded the case for consideration in light of Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education,4 ' an intervening Supreme Court decision.4 2
On remand, the court of appeals held that the Richmond ordinance violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. 4 3 The United States Supreme Court noted probable ju45
44
risdiction on Richmond's appeal and affirmed the judgment.
In Defunis v. Odegaard,4 6 the Supreme Court, over the vigorous dissent ofJustice Douglas,4 7 avoided the difficult issue of the
constitutionality of benign or reverse discrimination on the
grounds that the case before it was moot. 48 The Supreme Court
did not address the merits of affirmative action until 1978 in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.4 9
In Bakke, the Supreme Court considered the validity of a special minority admissions program at the Medical School of the
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978). Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 716. To demonstrate the constitutionality of a
minority set-aside plan, the test requires:
(1) [that] the governmental body have the authority to pass such legislation; (2) [that] adequate findings have been made to ensure that the governmental body is remedying the present effects of past discrimination
rather than advancing one racial or ethnic group's interests over another; (3) [that] the use of such classifications extend no further than the
established needs of remedying the effects of past discrimination.
Croson, 779 F.2d at 188 (quoting South Florida Chapter of the Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., 723 F.2d 846, 851-52
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).
41 476 U.S. 267 (1976).
42 See 478 U.S. 1016, rev'd, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 706
(1989)
43 Croson, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). The court
of appeals held that the Wygant Court's strict scrutiny standard signified that in
order to establish "that a plan is justified by a compelling governmental interest, a
municipality that wishes to employ a racial preference cannot rest on broad-brush
assumptions of historical discrimination." Id. at 1357. The court of appeals interpreted the above requirement to mean that "findings of societal discrimination will
not suffice; the findings must concern 'prior discrimination by the government unit
involved.'" Id. at 1358 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274) (emphasis in original).
The court found no record of prior discrimination and thus held that no compelling governmental interest supported the Plan. Id. at 1360. The court further held
that the 30% set-aside provision was not narrowly tailored for accomplishing a remedial purpose. Id.
44 J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 484 U.S. 1058 (1988).
45 Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706.
46 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
47 Id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 318-20.
49 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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University of California at Davis (Medical School).5 ° Alan Bakke
challenged the plan after he was twice denied admission even
though his qualifications outranked many students admitted
under the program.5" Bakke alleged that the Medical School's
race-conscious admissions program violated the equal protection
clause.5 2
A majority of the Court did not decide whether the Medical
School's program was constitutional.53 While the Court held that
the Davis plan could not stand,5 4 five justices accepted the principle that the use of racial considerations would not per se violate
equal protection.5 5 The Justices could not agree, however, on
when a race-based admissions program would pass constitutional
muster. 56 Justice Stevens, joined by ChiefJustice Burger andJustices Stewart and Rehnquist, posited that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196457 outlawed the Medical School's program and
made it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the program. 58 The remaining five, Justices Powell, Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun would have upheld the voluntary use of
race-conscious admissions programs, even when those programs
set aside a fixed number of admissions for minority group members. 59 These Justices argued that racial classifications designed
to further remedial purposes were not foreclosed by the Constitution in appropriate circumstances. 60 They further opined that
50 Id. at 272 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). The medical school admitted 100
students each year. Id. at 272. Under Davis' plan, 16 of the 100 seats were set aside
solely for minority group applicants. Id. at 275 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
Thus, designated minorities could compete for admission even though they may
not have been as qualified as those granted admission for the other 84 seats. Id.
51 Id. at 276-77 (Powell,J., plurality opinion). Student selections were based on
personal interviews, "overall grade point average, grade point average in science
courses, scores on the Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT), letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other biographical data." Id. at 274
(Powell, J., plurality opinion).
52 Id. at 277-78 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
53 Id. at 272 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
54 Id. at 271 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
55 Id. at 272 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) Uustices Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun joined Justice Powell).
56 Id. at 269 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
57 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2000d-6 (1982). The Act articulated a color-blind ideal in
which factors of race, color, religion, sex and national origin would not be the basis
of employment decisions. Id. at § 2000a.
58 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
59 Id. at 356 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
60 Id.
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an intermediate level of scrutiny" was appropriate to review benign racial preferences.6 2
Justice Powell provided the swing vote in Bakke, embracing a
strict scrutiny standard 6 3 to review the constitutionality of the admissions program under the equal protection clause.6 4 Justice
61 The intermediate standard of review adopted by the Justices was the standard
previously promulgated in gender cases. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In gender cases, an intermediate standard of review "eliminates the strong presumption of constitutionality
that exists under the rational basis standard of review but it allows the government
to employ a gender-based classification so long as it is a reasonable means of
achieving substantial government ends and not merely the arbitrary classifying of
people by sexual stereotypes." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 532 (1983). "Racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.' " Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
62 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun,.jJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). TheJustices, however, rejected the plurality's strict
scrutiny approach. Id. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Unquestionably we have held that a government practice or statute
which restricts "fundamental rights" or which contains "suspect classifications" is to be subjected to "strict scrutiny" and can be justified only if
it furthers a compelling interest and, even then only if no less restrictive
alternative is available. But no fundamental right is involved here. Nor
do whites as a class have any of the "traditional indicia of suspectness;
the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process."
Id. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
63 Id. at 291. Strict scrutiny has been used to evaluate the validity of classifications based on race or natural origin. Using strict scrutiny to determine if the classifications are invidious, the court will invalidate the classification unless it is
necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest of government. J.
NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 611 (1983). Further,
[b]urdening someone because of his national origin or status as a member of a racial minority runs counter to the most fundamental concept of
equal protection. To legitimate such a classification the end of the governmental action would have to outweigh the basic values of the
[a]mendment. For this reason no such classification has been upheld
since 1945 when there was any likelihood that it would burden racial

minorities.

Id.
64 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). The Bakke plurality rejected the University's contention that strict scrutiny should not be applied to white
applicants who are not a discrete and insular minority. Id. at 290 (Powell,J., plurality opinion) (citations omitted). The plurality stated that "[t]he guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something
else when applied to a person of another color." Id. at 289-90 (Powell, J., plurality
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Powell argued that all racial classifications are inherently suspect
and call for strict scrutiny review. 6 5 He also argued for a principle of individualized justice, whereby an individual would be
judged on the basis of worth and merit and not on the basis of
class membership. 66 While Justice Powell conceded that promoting diversity in the student body is a compelling interest for a
university, he posited that the Davis system, in which access to 16
seats was based solely on race, was not a necessary means for
promoting diversity. 6 7 Accordingly, Justice Powell joined Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist in determining
that the Medical School's program violated the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause and joined the plurality in
concluding that Bakke should be admitted.6 8 Justice Powell,
however, joined Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun in their position that colleges may give some consideration
to race in admissions. 69 Although the issue was squarely before
the Court in Bakke, 7 ° the Supreme Court's decision in that case
debate over reverse
left unsettled
the constitutional
discrimination. 7
The Supreme Court did not rule directly on an affirmative
action program until 1979, in United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber. 72 While the Weber Court upheld an affirmative action plan
on statutory grounds,73 the Court's opinion addressed some of
the intricacies of affirmative action programs. 4 At issue in Weber
was a private employer's apprenticeship program which required
that fifty percent of the training positions be reserved for
blacks. 7 5 A white production worker, who was passed over when
black employees were admitted into the training program,
opinion). The plurality further noted that classifications based on race have always
been subjected "to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 291 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 298 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
67 Id. at 314-15 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
68 Id. at 319-20 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
69 Id. at 320 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
70 Id. at 269-70 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
71 Id. at 320 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
72 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
73 Id. at 209. The majority held that the language of Title VII was "intended as

a spur or catalyst to cause 'employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the
last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history.' " Id.
at 204 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
74 Id.

75 Id. at 198.

The measure was temporary and was to be terminated upon
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claimed discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.76 A majority of the Court explained that the plan
passed statutory muster because its "purposes . . . mirror[ed]
those of the statute," and did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees." 7 7 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Burger posited that Title VII
prohibited all racial discrimination in employment.78 While the
Weber Court held that benign discrimination was permissible
under Title VII, 79 the Court left unanswered the question of
whether Congress could prohibit affirmative action and mandate
adherence to a color-blind standard.80
Finally, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 8 ' all nine Justices addressed
the issue of the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action. 2 Several construction contracting and subcontracting associations challenged the validity of the set-aside provision of the
Public Works Employment Act. 8 ' The Act was designed to proachieving a proportional percentage of black skilled craftworkers equal to the percentage of blacks in the local work force. Id. at 199.
76 Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to "discriminate
...because of... race" in hiring and in selecting apprentices for training programs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Specifically, section 703(a) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge to any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. Furthermore, section 703(d) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs, to discriminate against any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment
in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
Id.
77 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
78 Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79

80
81
82

Id. at 208.
Id.
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Id. at 455, 472 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).

83 Id. at 453. The set-aside provision as contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 6705(e)-

6707(j) (1982). The Act was challenged by a firm engaged in ventilation, air conditioning, and heating work, and several associations of construction contractors and
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vide four billion dollars of federal funds for various programs in
an attempt to revive a flagging economy. 8 4 The challenged provision ensured that ten percent of the funds would be allocated
to business enterprises owned by United States Citizens who
were "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos,
and Aleuts. ' 8 5 By a six to three vote, the Supreme Court rejected the constitutional challenge to the Public Works Employment Act.8 6
In his plurality opinion in Fullilove, Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Justices White and Powell, concluded that the program
would satisfy either the strict scrutiny or intermediate review
tests.8 7 Stressing Congress' broad remedial powers under the
commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment, Chief Justice
Burger found that Congress was empowered to identify the existence of past discrimination and implement race-conscious remedies to cure those effects.8 8 The Chief Justice further held that
the Public Works Employment Act's burden on nonminority
firms was relatively light, 89 and the program was not overinclusive because it provided for waiver and exemption of its provi90
sions in special circumstances.
The principal concurring opinion in Fullilove by Justice Marsubcontractors, who alleged that they sustained economic injury due to enforcement of the set-aside requirement. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 455 (Burger, C.J., plurality
opinion). The plaintiffs also alleged that the provision, on its face, violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the equal protection clause
of the fifth amendment and antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act.
Id.
84 Id. at 453 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
85 Id. at 454 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0)(2)
(1982). The provision at issue stated:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant
shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless
the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority
business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, 'minority business
enterprise' means a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned
by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at
least 51 per centum of stock of which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanishspeaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.
Id.
86 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
87
88
89

Id.

Id. at 472-73 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 484 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
90 Id. at 486-87 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
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shall applied intermediate scrutiny 9 ' to hold that the race-conscious set-aside was "substantially related to the achievement of
the important and congressionally articulated goal of remedying
the present effects of past discrimination. ' 9 2 Justice Powell filed
a separate concurrence in which he reaffirmed his position in
Bakke that all racial classifications should be subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis. 93 Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
took the flat position that "the government may never act to the
94
detriment of a person solely because of that person's race."
Justice Stevens dissented, supporting a standard beyond strict
scrutiny, a flat prohibition of racial classifications. 9 5
The Fullilove Court directly upheld Congress' power to use
race-conscious remedies in an effort to eradicate the effects of
past and present racial discrimination and to prevent the recurrence of that discrimination.9 6 The Court repudiated claims that
affirmative action was merely "reverse discrimination" and that
the Constitution prohibits any governmental practices that violate the principles of color-blindness. 97
In 1986, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,9" eight members of the Court firmly rejected the notion that only color-blind,
not race-conscious, measures are constitutional in hiring and layoff decisions.9 9 Once again, however, the Justices failed to agree
upon a standard of review for the race-based layoff program in
question.' 0 0 Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, White and ChiefJustice Burger, held that, even where
a race-conscious statute operated against a group that has not
historically been the victim of discrimination, strict scrutiny must
be applied.' 0 ' According to the plurality, the fact that society as a
whole had historically discriminated against blacks did not furnish a sufficiently compelling governmental interest. 0 2 AccordFor a discussion of intermediate level scrutiny, see supra note 61.
Id. at 521 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring opinion).
Id. at 525 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 490 (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion).
Id. at 482 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
98 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
99 Id. at 280 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
100 Id. at 269. The challenged scheme granted black teachers greater protection
from lay-offs than white teachers. Id. at 270-71 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
101 Id. at 273-74 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
102 Id. at 274 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). The plurality commented that
"[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a
racially classified remedy." Id. at 276 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). The Court,
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
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ingly, the Court posited that the plan contravened the equal
protection clause.o
In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. ,104 the Supreme Court alleviated tension between the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee and the enactment of race-conscious measures to
rectify the effects of past discrimination.' 5 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, explicitly stated that all programs sponsoring racial preferences, whether favoring whites or blacks,
would be tested by the same standard of equal protection review.' 0 6 Reaffirming the plurality opinion in Wygant, the Croson
constitutioncourt applied a strict scrutiny standard to assess the
0 7
ality of Richmond's minority set-aside program.
The Court began its analysis by determining the scope of
Richmond's power to enact legislation intended to ameliorate the
effects of past discrimination. 0 8 The majority stipulated that Fullilove was not dispositive in the Court's assessment of Richmond's
power to enact race-conscious programs. 0 9 The Court based its
decision upon the determination that in Fullilove Congress acted
pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment" 0 in an
attempt to enforce the dictates of the equal protection clause."'
however, did not impose a requirement that the public body make official findings
of discrimination. Id. at 277 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Rather, the court determined that there must be "sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there
has been prior discrimination." Id.
103 Id. at 284 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
104 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
105 Id. at 712, 730.
106 Id. at 721. For purposes of clarity, the opinion authored by justice O'Connor
is referred to as the majority, although Parts II, III-A and V of the opinion have
been joined only by a plurality of the Court. See id. at 712. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion and announced thejudgment of the Court with respect to sections
I, III-B and IV. Id. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White on section II. Id. On sections III-A and V, Justice O'Connor delivered an opinion which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Kennedy. Id.
107 Id. at 722-23.
108 Id. at 717.
109 Id. The Court differentiated Fullilove from Croson on the basis that the former
dealt with an exercise of congressional power while the latter involved an exercise
of state power. Id. at 719.
110 See supra note 1.
111 Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 719. The Croson Court explained that "[c]orrectly viewed,

§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 651 (1966)). See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)
(Congress may enforce constitutional prohibitions); Note, Fulilove, 96 YALE L.J.
453, 474 (1987) ("Fullilove clearly focused on the constitutionality of a congressionally
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Conversely, the Croson majority determined that states are constrained in their remedial efforts by section one of the fourteenth
amendment. 1 2 The Court stated that a state, however, may possess the authority to remedy the effects of private discrimination
within its own legislative domain, provided that the state identifies the discrimination with particularity as prescribed in the fourteenth amendment. 1 3 Consequently, the Croson majority held
that the court of appeals erred insofar as it followed by rote Wygant's ruling that the equal protection clause mandated a showing
of prior discrimination by the government entity involved." 4
In explaining its adherence to a heightened standard of review, the Croson majority emphasized that section one of the fourteenth amendment guarantees personal rights. ' 5 The Court
interpreted section one in accordance with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, finding that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection
cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color."" l 6 Considering that Richmond's Plan denied individuals, solely on a
racial basis, the opportunity to compete for a percentage of public contracts, the majority opined that an in-depth inquiry into
Richmond's justification for the Plan was necessary to ensure that
Richmond was pursuing a remedial goal sufficiently important to
warrant its use of a highly suspect tool. Further, the Court
stressed that the means chosen must have been narrowly tailored
to the compelling goal so that there was little possibility that the
classification was motivated by racial politics or illegitimate nomandated set-aside program") (emphasis in the original). See generally Comment,
Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove: Benign Discriminationand CongressionalPower to Enforce the
FourteenthAmendment, 56 IND. L.J. 473 (1981) (analyzing Congress' authority pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment).
112 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719-20. See supra note 92. In Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 345 (1880), the Supreme Court stated that the fourteenth amendment was
intended to limit state powers and enlarge congressional powers. See infra note 152
and accompanying text.
113 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 720. The court of appeals held that Virginia law vested
authority in Richmond to enact the Plan. SeeJ.A. Croson v. City of Richmond, 779
F.2d 181, 187 (4th Cir. 1985); vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), rev'd, 822
F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987); aff'd 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). The court of appeals' determination was not disturbed by the Court's subsequent conclusion that the set-aside
program violated the equal protection clause. Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 720.
114

Id.

Id. at 720-21 (citing Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)). See also supra
note 1 (constitutional foundation for congressional enforcement).
116 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 289-90 1978)).
'15
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tions of racial inferiority. 1 7 Such findings, the majority explained, would serve to define the scope of the injury as well as
the remedy necessary to cure its effects. 1 8 The Court indicated
that a proper determination of remedial necessity also operates
to assure all citizens that the deviation from the customary equal
treatment of all ethnic and racial groups is only a temporary measure taken to effectuate equality itself." 9
Justice O'Connor inquired into whether Richmond had
presented evidence which identified discrimination in the city's
construction industry sufficient to demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on a racial basis.' 2 ° The Court held that the city failed to establish a
compelling governmental interest justifying the ordinance.121
According to the majority, Richmond's goal of ameliorating the
effects of societal discrimination, as compared to remedying
wrongs caused by specific instances of discrimination, was an inadequate basis for race-conscious classifications. 12 2 The Court
reasoned that Richmond's generalized assertion of past discrimination in the construction industry was flawed because it did not
provide guidance for Richmond's legislature to determine the ex123
act scope of the injury it intended to remedy.
Similarly, the majority rejected Richmond's argument that it
was attempting to remedy various past discriminatory practices
including the exclusion of blacks from construction training programs and trade unions. 124 The Court repudiated the city's justification for the program on the grounds that several nonracial
factors were included in Richmond's analysis of past discrimination despite the fact that these factors burdened all races who
might try to build a new business enterprise. 1 25 The majority
held that Richmond could only establish a compelling interest in
remedying the effects of past discrimination upon a showing of
"judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional
117
118

Id.
Id.

119 Id. at 730.
120 Id. at 723.
121

Id.

Id. at 722-23 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307
(1978)).
123 Id. at 723. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986).
124 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723.
125 Id. at 723-24. The factors considered were deficiencies in working capital,
inability to meet bonding requisites, and unfamiliarity with bidding procedures. Id.
122

220

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:205

or statutory violations." 26
Furthermore, the Croson majority rejected the district court's
justification for concluding that Richmond's Plan was warranted
by past incidents of discrimination.1 27 The Court determined
that the Plan's proclaimed remedial intention was insufficient to
justify the Plan;1 28 the mere assertion of a legitimate or benign
purpose for the racial classification was not probative. 29 The
Court also determined that opinions of Plan proponents regarding the existence of discrimination in the construction industry
were entitled to little or no weight. 3 '
Additionally, the majority noted that Richmond misplaced
dependence on the disparity between the city's minority popula3
tion and the number of contracts granted to minority firms.' '
Finding numerous explanations for the dearth of minority participation in local contractors' associations, 32 the Court also discredited the lower court's reliance on this disparity to establish
discrimination.13 3 Lastly, a majority of the Justices remarked that
congressional findings of discrimination in connection with the
approved Fullilove set-aside provision did3 4 not demonstrate the
presence of discrimination in Richmond.
126 Id. at 723 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 307 (1978)).
127 Id. at 724.
128 Id.
129 Id. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16 (1975) ("This
Court need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation.")
(citations omitted).
130 Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 724. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
235-40 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (no reasonable relation to public danger
supported constitutional deprivation).
131 Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 725. The majority unequivocally stated that "[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general
population rather than to the small groups of individuals who possess the necessary
qualifications may have little probative value." Id. at 725 (quoting Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977)). Accord Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 651-52 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See also Mayor v. Educ. Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974) ("[T]his is not a
case in which it can be assumed that all citizens are fungible for purposes of determining whether members of a particular class have been unlawfully excluded.").
132 Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 726. The Supreme Court set forth several reasons for
low MBE membership in Richmond's contractors' associations. Id. The reasons
included past societal discrimination in economic and educational opportunities as
well as differences in white and black entrepreneurial and career choices. Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 727. The court noted that by including a waiver provision in the national program, Congress expressly recognized that the problem's scope would
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In addition to rejecting the factual predicate which Richmond offered to support the Plan, the majority noted that Richmond proffered "absolutely no evidence" of past discrimination
against Oriental, Eskimo, Aleut, Indian, or Spanish-speaking
people in any aspect of Richmond's construction industry.135
The majority held that Richmond failed to identify any discrimination in the city's construction industry. 1 36 The Court therefore
decided that Richmond lacked a compelling interest to apportion
public contracts on a racial basis.' 37 The Court posited that the
strongly impugned RichPlan's overinclusion of racial groups 1 38
mond's claim of remedial motivation.
After determining that the Richmond Plan was not linked to
identified discrimination, the Court considered whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored to rectify the effects of past discrimination. 139 Acknowledging that a determination of whether the
Plan was narrowly tailored was virtually impossible without linking the Plan to any identified discrimination, the Court limited its
discussion to two observations in concluding that the program
was not properly tailored. 140 First, the Court recognized that
even though Richmond justified its scheme by suggesting nonracial barriers to minority involvement in the construction industry, 14 1 the city council failed to consider utilizing race-neutral
means to increase participation. 14 2 Second, the Court did not
view the Plan's thirty percent quota as being narrowly tailored to
any legitimate goal. 14 3 According to the majority, the quota
rested upon the assumption that minorities will choose certain
114
trades in direct proportion to their ratio in the population.
vary from one market area to another. Id. at 726 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 487 (1980)). Moreover, the majority explained that, in Fullilove, Congress
acted pursuant to its enforcement powers under section five of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 726-27. See supra note 1.
135 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 727-28 (emphasis in original).
136 Id. at 727.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 728-29.
139 Id. at 728.
140 Id.

141 Id. at 723-24. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.

142 Id. at 728. The Supreme Court listed several race-neutral devices, such as
relaxation of bonding requirements, financial aid and training for disadvantaged
entrepreneurs, and simplification of bidding procedures, which Richmond could

have employed to increase overall participation in the city's construction industry.
Id. at 729.
143 Id. at 728.
144 Id. The Croson Court reiterated that "[iut is completely unrealistic to assume

that individuals of one race will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each em-
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Considering that the Plan entitled any Hispanic, Oriental, or
Black entrepreneur from anywhere in the country to an absolute
preference over another individual solely because of race, the
Court posited that Richmond's Plan was obviously not narrowly

tailored.

"45

In his concurrence, Justice Stevens opined that the fourteenth amendment requires that courts evaluate race-based governmental decisions principally by studying their likely impact on
the future. 14'6 Accordingly, Justice Stevens disagreed with the underlying premise of the majority's decision that permissible racebased classifications are limited to those which remedy past
wrongs. 1 4 7 Justice Stevens did agree, however, that Richmond's
ordinance could not be justified as a remedy for past
discrimination. 148
The Justice grounded his compliance on three particular aspects of the case. " 9 First, Justice Stevens noted that racial diversity is not necessary for the efficient performance of construction
contracts. 150 Second, according to the Justice, Richmond's city
council, a policymaking entity which promulgated rules governing future conduct, was ill-suited and ill-equipped to enact
legislation fashioned to remedy a past wrong. 15 ' Third, Justice
Stevens postulated that Richmond should have specifically identified characteristics of the city's favored and disfavored contractors which justified their disparate treatment. 152
Justice Kennedy authored a separate opinion in which he
concurred in the judgment, but articulated that the fourteenth
amendment should not be interpreted to reduce a state's power
to eradicate racial discrimination unless a conflict with federal
law exists or the state remedy, like Richmond's, violates equal
protection. 5 3 Justice Kennedy agreed withJustice Scalia's observation that a rule which automatically invalidates racial preferployer or union absent unlawful discrimination." Id. at 728 (quoting Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
145 Id. at 729.
146 Id. at 730 (Stevens, J., concurring).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 730-31 (Stevens, J., concurring).
149 Id. at 731 (Stevens,J., concurring).
150 Id. Contra Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-15 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 731-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
152 Id. at 732 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452-53 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
153 Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ences would abandon the precedential requirement of a case-bycase analysis.1 54 Therefore, Justice Kennedy accepted the majority's less absolute strict scrutiny standard' 55 and found that Richmond's ordinance could not survive such rigorous review. 56
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia vehemently agreed
with the majority's conclusion that all racial classifications must
survive a strict scrutiny test, whether the proposed purpose is benign or remedial. 57 TheJustice refrained from concurring, however, with the majority's indication that in certain circumstances
state and local governments may enact race-based classifications
to remedy the effects of previous discrimination. 158 According to
Justice Scalia, a state may mandate racial preferences to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination only when, as in school desegregation cases, such action is necessary to eradicate the state's
own maintenance of a scheme of unlawful racial classifications.' 59
The Justice stipulated that in such circumstances the state's remedial authority extends only as far as the scope of the constitutional violation 60 and ceases once the unlawful system has been
rectified.16 1 In the absence of such remediation, the Justice argued that only a social emergency which threatens imminent
peril to life and limb may justify an exception to the fourteenth
amendment's principle that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,
Id.
Id. The Justice supported such a rigorous rule because the standard commands race neutrality by permitting the use of all classifications, even those narrowly drawn, only as a last resort. Id. Justice Kennedy also noted that the rule is
not absolute because race-conscious relief may be the only adequate remedy in instances of equal protection violations, and such a rule is consistent with prior decisions. Id.
156 Id. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157 Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring).
158 Id. Justice Scalia expressed agreement with the views of Alexander Bickel
who stated that "[t]he lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the
lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently
wrong, and destructive of democratic society." Id. (quoting A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)).
159 Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also used the example that a
state agency which compensated all black employees at a rate 20% less than nonblack employees may promulgate an order increasing the black employees' salaries
by 20%. Id. (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986)).
160 Id. at 738 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 465 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977);
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver,
Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973)).
161 Id.
154

155
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and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."' 1 62 Jus-

tice Scalia noted that states remain free to utilize race-neutral
means to remedy the effects of past discrimination.' 63
In a fervent dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun, opined that Richmond's set-aside Plan
was indistinguishable from the federal program upheld in Fullilove and was similarly constitutional.' 64 Justice Marshall criticized
the majority's position that Richmond had failed to prove the
existence of discrimination in the city's construction contracting
industry.' 65 According to the dissent, Richmond catalogued adequate findings to establish that minorities had been wrongly excluded from public contracting. 166 Justice Marshall posited that
the Croson decision was a departure from the Constitution's fourteenth amendment demands and that the Croson decision would
unnecessarily deter states and localities from attempting 1to
rec67
tify past discrimination through race-conscious remedies.
Initially, the dissent attacked the majority's restrictive view
of the factual predicate which influenced Richmond's enactment
of the Plan.' 68 Justice Marshall argued that the majority should
have analyzed Richmond's initiative against the backdrop of evidence which documented nationwide racial discrimination in the
construction industry. 169 TheJustice stated that the necessity for
Richmond's Plan would have been readily apparent to the majority if the majority had considered the incidence of discrimination
70
nationwide. 1

Furthermore, Justice Marshall advocated a lesser standard
162 Id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Scalia noted that "the Civil War
Amendments were designed to 'take away all possibility of oppression by law because of race and color' and 'to be . . . limitations on the power of the States and
enlargements of the power of Congress.' " Id. at 736 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).
163 Id. at 738 (Scalia, J., concurring).
164 Id. at 739 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980)).
165 Id. at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166 Id. The proof referred to by justice Marshall included: testimony by Richmond's officials that discrimination had been widespread in the city's construction
industry; the federal studies relied on in the Fullilove decision which showed that
minorities were excluded nationally from the construction contracting industry;
and statistics establishing that minority-owned businesses have received little, if
any, city contracting dollars and seldom belong to area trade associations. Id.
167

Id.

168
169
170

Id.
Id. at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 743 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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for testing affirmative action programs against the dictates of the
equal protection clause.' 7 ' In the Justice's opinion, race-conscious classifications furthering remedial objectives will withstand scrutiny if they are proven to serve important
governmental objectives and if they substantially relate to the
achievement of those objectives.' 72 Justice Marshall opined that
this two-prong
Richmond's set-aside provision clearly satisfied
1 73
constitutional.
was
therefore,
and
standard,
Justice Marshall proceeded to illustrate how Richmond's
17 4
conduct satisfied both prongs of the equal protection inquiry.
According to Justice Marshall, Richmond satisfied two important
governmental interests by setting aside a portion of its public
contracting dollars for minority-owned businesses. 75 First, the
Justice deemed that the city's motive in alleviating the effects of
past discrimination was an important, even a compelling, interest. 176 Justice Marshall found that Richmond's second justifiable
interest entailed preventing the city's spending decisions from
tacitly encouraging, adopting, or furthering racial discrimination.1 7 7 The Justice further determined that Richmond had proffered sufficient evidence of prior racial discrimination to support
remediation and governmental nonperpetuation interests. 17 8 In
assimilating Richmond's ordinance to the federal set-aside provision upheld in Fullilove, Justice Marshall further argued that Richrelationship prong
mond's Plan comported with the substantial
79
analysis.'
clause
protection
of the equal
Justice Marshall expanded his dissent in an attempt to undermine the majority's adoption of a strict scrutiny standard. 80
The Justice found the adoption of a strict scrutiny standard unwelcomed.' 8 ' Justice Marshall distinguished between inherently
racist governmental actions and those actions seeking to eradi171 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172 Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 369
(1978) (joint separate opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301-02 (1986) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517-19 (1980) (Marshall,J., concurring in
the judgment)).
173 Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
174 Id.

175 Id.
176

Id.

177 Id. at 744 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178

Id. at 745 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

179 Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
180
181

Id. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
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cate the effects of past racism or to prevent governmental perpetuation of such racism.' 8 2 While the Justice believed that the
former classifications warrant strict judicial scrutiny, the Justice
posited that the latter should not be subjected to such a fatal
standard. 8 ' Justice Marshall also attacked the majority's contention that strict scrutiny was especially warranted in this case because the blacks were a dominant racial group in Richmond.' 8 4
While the Justice agreed that the political and numerical
supremacy of a racial group is one factor to consider in determining the applicable level of scrutiny, he indicated that numerical
18 5
inferiority was an insufficient basis for imposing strict scrutiny.
Finally, Justice Marshall expressed dissatisfaction with the
Court's restriction of the use of remedial measures by a state or
locality absent a prima facie showing of statutory or constitutional violation. 186
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, filed a separate
dissent, in which he depicted the Court's decision as a regressive
and insensitive approach towards victims of past discrimination
in the construction industry.' 8 7
Croson casts constitutional doubt on programs throughout
the nation which resemble Richmond's Plan. 1 88 The Court has
finally explicitly found that laws favoring blacks over whites will
be judged by the same constitutional standard that is applied to
laws favoring whites over blacks. 189 Justice O'Connor clearly
stated that Croson was not the death knell for affirmative action
programs.' 90 Justice O'Connor did, however, articulate thatjudi182 Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301-02 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517-19 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 355-62 (1978) (joint separate opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall and

Blackmun, JJ.)).
183 Id.
Id. at 752-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 753 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 754 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Kelp, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983); Michigan
Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 571 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1983); South Fla.
Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, Fla., 723 F.2d 846 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 71 (1984); Arrington Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 403 So.2d 893 (Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 913 (1982); Associated Gen. Contractors v. City & County of San Francisco,
619 F. Supp. 334, 335 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist.,
662 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 594 (1982).
189 Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989).
190 Id. at 729.
184
185
186
187
188
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cial approval will be the exception and not the rule. 9 ' "In the
extreme case," she stated, "some form of narrowly tailored racial
preference might2 be necessary to break down patterns of deliber9
ate exclusion."

The dissenting Justices reiterated the arguments thatJustice
Blackmun advanced in Bakke, finding that "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race." 93 While Justice
Blackmun's argument may have carried some weight eleven years
ago, it has lost its appeal. Justice O'Connor's decision in Croson
assures that race will become less relevant in American life, and
that the ultimate goal of "eliminat[ing] entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's
race" will someday be achieved.' 94
Affirmative action has a certain superficial appeal-somewhat akin to frontier justice. Reduced to simplest terms, it would
fight discrimination with discrimination. The laudable purpose
of remedying past discrimination does not, however, diminish
the basic tenet that discrimination is intrinsically wrong.
As proclaimed in Bakke, "preferential programs reinforce
common stereotypes that certain groups are incapable of achieving success without special protection based on a factor being no
relation to individual worth."' 9 5 Affirmative action may well
bring an individual to an opportunity; however, the danger persists that he or she will be perceived as neither fairly deserving
the position nor possessing the competence to perform. In the
final analysis then, are we really removing the stigma or replacing
it with a new one? "A solution to the first problem that aggra' 96
vates the second is no solution at all."'
Is it possible that the cure is worse than the disease?
TammyJ. Spivack
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